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MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW
ACQUIREMENT OF TITLE BY A WILLFL TInSPAsSER AND COMPENSATION 1VOR
TH- TrxsPASSa.The interaction of the basic maxim of substantive law,
that no man may be deprived of his property without his consent, and the
correlative maxim of adjective law, that the courts will give exact compen-
sation for property taken or destroyed, together with the more or less me-
chanical rules of damages depending upon the form of action used, have
in their outcome gone far toward justifying the somewhat grandiloquent
utterance of our legal forbears of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries,
that the "Common Law is the perfection of human wisdom." The final stage
in this development is shown in the late cases of Polk County v. Parker,
(Iowa, Dec., i916), i6o N. W. 32o and Warren Stove Co. v. Hardy, et al.,
(Ark., Oct., 1917), 198 S. W. 99.
Since the decision in Wetherbee v. Green has domesticated the relative
value rule in English law there has been much controversy and litigation
over the fatio of disparity which will effect a transfer of title. The ratio
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in this case was twenty-eight to one. Judge Cooley afterwards, in Isle
Royale Mining Co v. Hertin, (1877), 37 Mich. 332, said that a ratio of three
to two was not sufficient. In Eaton v. Langley, (i898), 65 Ark. 448, a ratio
of six to two was held inadequate, while in Louis Werner Stave Co. v. Pick-
erif, (i9o9), 55 Tex. C. A. 632, a ratio of three to one did effect a transfer
of title. We may conclude from this that the disparity must be so great
that it will "shock the conscience of the court" to apply the old common
law rule for the protection of the original holder of title, though the exact
point at which this will occur seems not very well determined.
When the bulwark of title yields for the benefit of the innocent tres-
passer, it does not leave the original holder of title without a remedy. He
is to be made whole by adequate compensation for what he has lost and,
in case the thing converted has increased in value for any reason, the
amount of compensation is affected by the form of action that may be used
in the suit for recovery. If trover or trespass is used, the recovery should
logically be the value at the time and place of conversion. If detinue or
replevin is used with the alternative recovery in damages, the amount should
be the value at the time of the suit. In case the property appropriated has
not been increased in value enough to effect a change of title and the suit
is brought under the formless action of the code, these several conflicting
principles are reconciled by allowing an inadvertent trespasser to keep all
that has been added to the finished product by his own efforts, while the
trespassee gets back the value of his title at the time of the conversion plus
any increment of the market, if such there be. Eaton v. Langley, (i898), 65
Ark. 448. It is to the credit of the courts in some of our non-code states
that the same equitable result is reached whether the form of action be
trover, as in Winchester v. Craig, (1876), 33 Mich. 205, 'or replevin, as in
Gustin v. Embury-Clark Lumber Co., (igo6), 145 Mich. Iot.
All of this equitable relaxation of strict maxims of law and rules of
practice has, however, been made for the benefit of the inadvertent tres-
passer, but in the first of the instant cases there enters that nefandissimus
Germanus of the Common Law, the willful trespasser. In Polk County v.
Parker, supra, a city assessor took "pages from a discarded county plat
book and, outside of office hours, put on this paper valuable maps and plats.
When he left the office he took away the book with the maps 'and plats.
The county sued out a writ of replevin and secured possession of them.
They were worth about $i,5oo. It was held that title had passed to the
willful trespasser, thus answering in the affirmative the question that has
been asked ever since the decision in Wetherbee v. Green, namely, will the
rule in that case apply if the trespass is intentional, the very great disparity
between the title converted and the labor and skill added being sufficient to
"shock the conscience of the court into a decision favorable to the wicked
trespasser? This, of course, reverses the acknowledged principle of the
civil law, adopted in the case of Silsbury v. M'Coon, (i85o), 3 Comst. (N.
Y.) 379, that "a willful wrong doer acquires no property in the goods of
another, either by the wrongful taking or by any change wrought in them by
his labor or skill, however great the change may be." By a natural exten-
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sion in the principle of this last mentioned case even the bona fide purchaser
for value from the willful trespasser cannot convey what he himself does
not have. Wooden Ware Company v. United States, (1882), io6 U. S. 432,
represents the weight of authority on this point, though Railway Co. v.
Hutchins, (1877), 32 Ohio St. 584, protests strongly against this on the
ground that "the estoppel, so to call it, being created by fraud or wrong,
exists only against the one guilty of that fraud or wrong, which the pur-
chaser is not!"
In the Arkansas case of Warren Stave Co. v. Hardy, supra, the facts
bring before the court all of the conflicting principles rehearsed above. The
agent of the appellant had bought stave bolts from one Jolly. Jolly had
bought the standing oak timber out of which the bolts were made from one
Turner, who claimed to own the land on which the timber was growing, but
refused to tell how he got title thereto. Jolly had cut and removed the
trees and sold the bolts to the appellant's agent. The title to the land on
which the timber stood was not in Turner, as he claimed, but belonged to
Hardy, the appellee. The standing timber was worth between $2.5o and $3
a cord. The stave bolts from $25 to $5o a cord, depending on the sort of
staves for which they were used. It was held, that Jolly was a willful tres-
passer. As such he should, according to rule, acquire no right or interest
in the timber, and the purchaser from him, though innocent; should ac-
quire no greater right than the trespasser had. It was further held that the
defendant was liable for the value of the stave bolts on the market less the
charges of transportation, and not merely for the value of the logs before
being worked up. Since the question of damages had arisen as an inci-
dent of the suit to quiet title to the land, the question of the transfer of
title of the timber after its conversion into personalty did not come up, but
the result of the decision is that while the injured party has received full
compensation for his title, as though sold on the best market, the willful
trespasser has acquired title to the chattel converted, when the ratio between
the value of the chattel taken and the finished product is about ten to one,
and has succeeded in transferring this right to the innocent purchaser who
is allowed to keep this title on payment to the trespassee of the value of the
chattel at the time of conversion, plus sucl a sum as may have been added
to the converted property by any increment in the market for staves or from
any "other causes independent of the acts of the defendant", cf. Weymouth
v. Chi and N. W. Ry. Co., (1863), 17 Wis. 572. Everybody has received his
just dues. the various maxims of law act in unison and lawyers' law is in
harmony with justice. J.H.D.
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